There is reliable evidence that simple rules used by traders have some predictive v alue over the future movement of foreign exchange prices. This paper will review some of this evidence and discuss the economic magnitude of this predictability. The protability of these trading rules will then be analyzed in connection with central bank activity using intervention data from the Federal Reserve. The objective is to nd to what extent foreign exchange predictability can be conned to periods of either high or low central bank activity. The results indicate that after removing periods in which the Federal Reserve is active, exchange rate predictability i s dramatically reduced.
Introduction
One of the biggest controversies between academic and applied nance is the usefulness of technical trading strategies. These rules, which i n tend to nd patterns in past prices capable of giving some prediction of future price movements are sold by many as easy ways to make money, and scoed at by many a s c harlatanism. Since the publication of Fama & Blume (1966) most academics have agreed that the usefulness of these ad hoc forecasting techniques was probably close to zero. Two facts suggest that this conclusion may be a little premature. Recently, Brock et al: (1992) showed using a bootstrap methodology that the rules did at least generate statistically signicant forecastability. More important to this study, for foreign exchange markets the evidence has been much more suggestive of technical trading rules actually providing useful trading information. 1 This is strengthened by other foreign exchange puzzles related to biases in forward markets, and deviations from uncovered interest parity, summarized in Hodrick (1987) . This paper looks at a possible explanation for some of the predictability found in foreign exchange markets. That is, predictions coming from very simple moving average type trading rules generate returns which are not eliminated by transactions costs and are economically large. From a trader's standpoint the rules used here are extremely primitive, and this paper does not have m uch to say to traders operating at higher frequencies and using more complicated rules. It is trying to address why such o b vious and simple rules \leave s o m uch money on the table."
The explanation that will be explored is whether any of this predictability is related to central bank behavior. Using intervention series available from the Federal Reserve, predictability will be compared during periods with and without intervention. Recent w ork by Dominguez & Frankel (1993) suggests a stronger impact from sterilized foreign exchange intervention than previously thought which reopens the question about what kind of impact central banks have in modern oating foreign exchange markets.
This paper is less of a direct analysis of intervention on foreign exchange rates, and more of an indirect picture of how it aects one type of agent. In spirit it might be closest to the the studies of Leahy (1989) and Taylor (1982) which try to analyze the protability of one player, the Federal Reserve. This study takes a dierent approach b y analyzing the protability of the potential trading of one player, a slightly naive agent, using a pretty common o the shelf trading rule. All of these are related to Friedman's (Friedman (1953) ) hypothesis that a currency stabilizing central bank should be making money on foreign exchange intervention. Here, we turn the table and look at the question from the trader's side. Is this trader loosing money when the central bank is in buying low and selling high?
The paper follows in 4 short sections. First, the times series are summarized. The second section reviews the results of previous work, and clearly demonstrates the magnitude of predictability i n these series. The next section looks at predictability when the Federal Reserve is not active, and the next section performs some empirical explorations on the dynamics of intervention and foreign exchange movements. The nal section concludes.
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The earliest tests were in Dooley & Shafer (1983) . Also, Sweeney (1986) presents results consistent with some usefulness to technical rules. More recent studies have included Taylor (1992) , LeBaron (1991) , and Levich & Thomas (1993) . The latter two employed bootstrap techniques to further emphasize the magnitude of the forecastability. Other related evidence includes that of Taylor & Allen (1992) which shows the extent to which traders continue to use technical analysis. Also, uses the technical trading rules to build moment conditions for estimation of persistent trend processes.
Data Summary
This study uses both weekly and daily foreign exchange series from NatWest Bank provided by DRI. The series represent the London close for the West German Mark (DM) and Japanese Yen (JY) extending from January 2nd, 1979 through, December 31st, 1992. The weekly series use the Wednesday close from this daily series. The interest rate series are 1 week eurorates (London close) for each currency from the London Financial Times and NatWest Bank covering the same period. Summary statistics for the log rst dierences of the two daily foreign exchange series are given in The most important series used in this study are the Federal Reserve i n tervention values provided by the Federal Reserve Bank. These series represent the amount o f i n tervention from the Federal Reserve in purchases (or sales) of dollars in relation to the DM or JY. 2 Figure 1 shows the DM/$ exchange rate plotted along with the amount o f F ederal Reserve purchases(+) or sales(-) of dollars. A few important features are clear from the picture. First, intervention is a very sporadic policy with long periods in which the Federal Reserve remained calm. Second, there appears to be a lot of persistence to the direction of intervention in terms of purchases and sales, but overall intervention has been relatively balanced between the buying and selling sides. Finally, it is dicult to tell whether certain episodes of intervention moved the exchange rate in the desired direction simply by looking at the picture. Table 2 gives a further summary of these intervention series. It shows that unconditionally the mean intervention levels are close to zero which is consistent with gure 1. However, the table shows that conditional on the intervention occurring the mean absolute value of daily purchases or sales is near 100 million dollars. The most important n umbers in table 2 (for this study) are the fraction of days that intervention is going on. For the DM this is 0:118, and for the JY this is 0:056, indicating that Federal Reserve i n tervention activity only occurs on a small fraction of days. The table also estimates markov transition probabilities from no intervention to intervention P(IjO), and intervention to no intervention P(OjI). These This crude markov analysis does not take i n to account that intervention might be generally active during a several week period, but there may be some days during this time that intervention is not active.
Trading Rule Evidence
This section repeats earlier statistical evidence on the forecasting properties of a simple technical trading rule. Many of these results are given in more detail in LeBaron (1991) . Forecasts will be examined over 1 day a n d 1 w eek horizons. The rule used compares the current price to a moving average of past prices. Let P t be the $/DM exchange rate at time t. Dene ma t as
where M is the length of the moving average. For the daily data M = 150 and for weekly M = 30. 4 Dene a buy or sell signal s t as s t = 1 if P t ma t 1 if P t < m a t :
This is an extremely trivial type of trading rule, but the strategy here is to look at the simplest versions of trading rules following common practices in use.
The application of this rule will be simplied to make some of the analysis clearer. Let p t = log(P t ), and r t , r t be the domestic and foreign rates of interest respectively. Dynamic returns from the strategy will be dened as, x t = s t (p t+1 p t (log(1 + r t ) log(1 + r t ))):
The value on the right side is simply the log dierence on the exchange rate corrected for the interest dierential. This return is then multiplied by + 1 o r 1 depending on the buy or sell signal. This corresponds roughly to a zero cost strategy of borrowing in one currency to go long in the other. 5 For completeness the strategy will also be implemented without the interest rate dierential, x t = s t (p t+1 p t ): Table 3 examines the these dynamic trading returns for both daily and weekly exchange rates. The t-statistics in the table test whether the mean returns are zero. It is clear from the table that the means from the dynamic strategies are statistically dierent from zero at any reasonable signicance level. It also appears that adjusting for the interest dierentials and changing from daily to weekly returns does not aect the results greatly. These t-tests may not be the proper way to test for signicance because of the deviations from normality, so a second experiment i s performed. A sample of bootstrapped random walk price series is generated using the log price dierences of the original series. These dierences are scrambled with replacement and a new series is built. Then the returns from the dynamic strategies, implemented on these simulated random walk series, are compared to the original. The column labeled P-Value presents the fraction of simulations generating a dynamic return larger than the original. The column agrees with the 4 Trading rule protability is not overly sensitive to the the actual length of the moving average. See LeBaron (1991) for some evidence on this. Also, these moving average lengths are very commonly used by traders.
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The interest rates used are 1 week Eurorates. This covers the correct return span for the weekly returns. For the daily returns it is only an approximation. Tests for signicance of 1 period trading rule returns. N is the number of returns tests, and mean is their mean value. T-Ratio is a t-test for the mean 1 period return. Sharpe is the estimated 1 year Sharpe ratio. Trade Fraction is the fraction of days on which a trade takes place. P-value is the fraction of 500 simulated random walks generating a return as large as that in the actual data.
t-tests in indicating the signicance of these means. The column labeled Sharpe estimates the Sharpe ratio over a one year horizon. This is approximated as, p N E(r) r where r is the standard deviation over the short horizon. N is the number of small periods in a one year period. This approximation is correct if the dynamic returns were independent o v er time. 6 The values in the table show that when ignoring transactions costs Sharpe ratios in the range of 0:6 0:9 are attained. This compares with Sharpe ratios of around 0:3 o r 0 : 4 for buy and hold strategies on aggregate U.S. stock portfolios. 7 Finally, the column labeled \Trade Fraction" shows the fraction of days on which an actual trade took place, or in other words the fraction of times the strategy had to switch currencies. The low n umbers here foreshadow the relatively small impact from transactions costs that will be shown later.
Zero The Sharpe ratios used here are for continuously compounded expected returns. Sharpe ratios for actual returns will be larger due to Jensen's inequality.
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See Hodrick (1987) or LeBaron (1991) for some further references and examples of Sharpe ratios on aggregate portfolios. For connections between Sharpe ratios to variance bound tests and more information on conditional Sharpe ratios for other portfolios see Bekaert & Hodrick (1992) .
To better asses the economic signicance of this predictability table 4 presents some simulation estimates of risk/return tradeos. One year periods are chosen at random from the entire sample and the returns over that period are summed. After 500 of these 1 year subperiods have been chosen the mean and standard deviation are estimated and used to estimate Sharpe ratios. Dierent levels of transactions costs are simulated by subtracting the costs every time a trade is made (change in sign in s t ). The table is in general agreement with the previous one for the zero cost Sharpe ratios.
It also tells us that implementing the rules with a 0:1% transaction cost does not greatly reduce the Sharpe ratios which are still in the range of 0:6 0:9. 8 The table does show a n e v entual drop o in the Sharpe ratio as the costs are increased. It is also clear that for the DM there are some 1 year periods in which the rule performs badly with returns less than 20 percent.
In summary, this section has demonstrated signicant forecastability from a simple moving average trading rule for two foreign exchange series. The results are unquestionably large statistically. Since they generate large Sharpe ratios, and their infrequent trading causes the returns to persist even when transactions costs are considered these returns appear to be economically signicant a s w ell. 9 Another curious feature that comes out of the rst two tables is that it appears that considering interest rates does not make m uch of a dierence for these results. It is a little disturbing that interest rates have such a small impact on the results, but it is consistent with deviations from uncovered parity which suggest that in the short run exchange rates movements do not correspond closely to interest rate dierentials. Another interesting fact that appears is that changing from daily to weekly frequency also does not make m uch of a dierence. This is somewhat curious since one would expect that giving the rule the chance to trade at the daily frequency would allow it greater opportunities. It is suggestive that what the rule picks up is a relatively long term phenomenon.
Removing Intervention Periods
This section looks at one possible explanation for the previously demonstrated puzzle in foreign exchange series. Is it possible that Federal Reserve i n tervention might be the cause for some of the predictability seen in some of these series. Some of the previous tests are repeated with the foreign exchange intervention periods removed. Figure 2 presents a time series of both the Federal Reserve intervention series along with a rolling estimate of 1-year Sharpe ratios for the interest adjusted daily DM returns. It is clear that the rule returns change over time, but the connection between the rules and intervention is not obvious from the gure.
This type of experiment is made more precise in table 5 where the experiments from table 3 are repeated with intervention days removed. We examine only the dynamic returns from t to t+1 conditioned on the intervention series being zero on t + 1 .F or weekly series an intervention period is dened as a week in which i n tervention occurred on at least 1 day. The results suggest a dramatic change when intervention periods are removed. For the DM series all of the t-statistics are not signicantly dierent from zero, and the Sharpe ratios are close to 0: The judgement of economic signicance would require more detailed testing of a specic model. For the moment all that can really be concluded is that the numbers appear \troublingly large". These results are very strong in suggesting that something dierent is going on when the Federal Reserve is active in terms of foreign exchange predictability. Before concluding that this is the overall cause of what is going on some further experiments will be performed. First, from gure 2 it is clear that there are some long periods in which the rule works and some in which it doesn't work very well. Also, the gure shows intervention to be somewhat persistent. Using the markov process from table 2 simulated intervention series are generated, simulating only in or out of the market, not magnitudes or signs. This simulated series is aligned with the actual returns series, and the returns without intervention are estimated. repeat the earlier mean returns with and without intervention periods. Markov mean is the mean from the 500 iterations of the simulated series. The P-value shows the fraction of the simulation runs giving a mean return as large as the No Intervention series from the original intervention data.
process. The table repeats the mean returns from the original series with and without intervention as well as the mean from 500 simulations removing the simulated intervention series. In each case only the results including interest adjustment are reported. The mean and variance from these simulations show the distribution to be much closer to that from the original series than the no intervention series. Finally, the p-value records the fraction of simulations giving a return lower than the no intervention series. For all the series this is close to zero. These results suggest that there really is something dierent about the intervention series, and it is unlikely that randomly removing points would give the results in table 5. A second, and more direct test is given in table 7. Here, intervention periods are removed for the other currency. In other words, the JY intervention days are removed from the DM series, and the DM intervention days are removed from the JY series. The purpose of this is to test whether there is something important about the direct intervention numbers or whether all intervention happens to occur in periods that are dominated by trending currencies. The table repeats the earlier results  of table 5 for two daily series. The strong reduction in signicance and Sharpe ratios seen before is clearly not present in these results. The signicance of the mean returns is still clearly indicated by the small P-Values close to 1 percent. The results in this section can be summarized graphically in gure 3. This picture clearly shows the dramatic reduction in Sharpe ratios for the trading rules for each of the series. While conclusions about causality cannot be made these results are very suggestive that Federal Reserve activity has something to do with the observed predictability.
Further Explorations
This section presents some early explorations into the dynamics of intervention periods and rule predictability to get some idea of what the mechanism is that is driving these results. Table 8 shows estimates of the probability of equal signs of s t , I t+1 , and x t+1 , where I t is the intervention at time t. All these results are conditioned on I t+1 being nonzero. The rst column shows the estimated probability of equal signs between the trading rule signal and next period's intervention. The values for both the DM and JY are very large, close to 80 percent. This is clearly signicantly dierent from independence. This connection shows that when the rule indicates to buy DM, the Federal Reserve is likely to be trying to support the dollar next period. This is consistent with the rule working because of a \leaning against the wind" policy. The second column shows the connection between the signal sign and the actual return sign next period. This connection is probably clear from some of the early tables. However, it is interesting that the sign connection is so dramatically large. Finally, the table presents the sign connection between the intervention and the return. It is again consistent with some leaning against the wind. 10 Finally, i t i s i n teresting to see if technical trading rules can actually predict intervention periods. This is interesting because it suggests a process where the central bank feels the exchange rate has gotten too far out of some reasonable range and decides to intervene to bring it back. The sign connections above suggest that the bank is working to move the exchange in this way (against the trend). Figures 4 and 5 show the probability of daily intervention on day t + 1 as a function of the price/moving average ratio at time t. The unconditional probability o f i n tervention is 0:056 for the Yen and 0:118 for the DM. The conditional probabilities are estimated using a moving band which is set to contain 20% of the points in each range. The band is moved from low to high in the p/ma range, estimating the probability of future intervention for each. The condence bands are 95% condence bands for the binomial test using the maximum probability o f i n tervention in each case. 11 12 For the Yen the pattern is consistent with the story of interventions occurring when the 10 For this last experiment the simultaneity bias may b e s e v ere in that the Federal Reserve i n tervention may b e induced by a desire to reverse the direction of the exchange rate.
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The asymptotic variance is p(1 p)=N for this case.
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This is basically a uniform kernel estimate with the bandwidth allowed to change as it moves through the data. exchange rate \gets out of line" by the technical rule's standard. Intervention near the midrange is very unlikely with almost all intervention occurring when the exchange rate is well above o r b e l o w some norm. For the DM the results are quite dierent. There is indication of large amounts of intervention for low p/ma, but there appears to be little evidence for lots of intervention for higher p/ma. These results show a n u n usual dierence between intervention policies on the Yen and the DM which should be further studied.
Series The fact that simple trading rules produce unusually large prots in foreign exchange series presents a series challenge to ecient market hypothesis. Further, the magnitude of these returns and their resiliency to the addition of transactions costs, makes dicult to imagine a representative agent rational expectations model capable of explaining these returns. Foreign exchange markets dier from most other major asset markets in that there are several major players around whose objectives may dier greatly from maximizing economic agents. The results in this paper show that this predictability puzzle is greatly reduced if not eliminated when There is still a serious simultaneity problem running through these results which makes strong policy recommendations dicult. It is not clear that the Federal Reserve causes ineciencies in the foreign exchange market, or just happens to be around when they occur. These results are still far from implicating the Federal Reserve in this puzzle, but they may make those whose biases are toward ecient markets a little more comfortable. If the Federal Reserve is transferring money to traders it may b e w orthwhile in that it has other variables in its objective function such a s o v erall stability. If the Federal Reserve can stop a potential trade war by purchasing foreign exchange at the right time then the trade o may b e good for United States. It is clear that the costs and consequences of foreign exchange need to be further analyzed. Also, more direct connections to some other work need to be made. The fact that Leahy (1989) nds intervention protable from the central bank standpoint i s a n i n teresting puzzle in connection with the results here.
These results can only be viewed as preliminary and much more work needs to be done. Further analysis of the dynamics of intervention and possible connections with interest rate movements is necessary. Also, replacement of the actual intervention series with published news reports should reveal evidence on how m uch traders could have used actual available information to capitalize on potential market ineciencies around intervention time periods.
